



Abstract This article considers the mechanics of acceptance in the law
of contract, focusing on the question of whether the silence of an offeree
can effect acceptance. It finds the rule in Felthouse v Bindley (1862) alive
and well, but creating problems for judges anxious to find agreements in
place. The article considers whether there is, as sometimes suggested, a
‘duty to speak’ and dismisses this, along with any other supposed excep-
tions to the rule, concluding that silence cannot effect acceptance, but
that conduct can do so unless an offeree ‘speaks’ to contradict inevitable
inferences from conduct. The article also argues that acceptance as such
is not required for agreement, but rather the communication of appar-
ent acceptance is the required element which, taken together with an
offer, forms an agreement.
I. Introduction
‘The medium is the message’ as Marshall McLuhan so famously
claimed. But what where the medium is supposedly one person’s si-
lence? Can silence convey anything? One of the first topics most first
year law students have to tackle is the doctrine of agreement, includ-
ing the rule that for a completed agreement there must be commu-
nication of acceptance to the offeror. The question posed in the first
sentence of this introduction should be quite easy to answer, one
simply says that silence cannot amount to acceptance; what is known
as the rule in Felthouse v Bindley.1 What no doubt seemed a straight-
forward matter in the 1860s, however, has given a good deal of trou-
ble to twentieth century judges, as we shall see in this article, which
has been inspired by the difficulties evinced by undergraduates in
tutorials with the author. This article will consider some of the situa-
tions which have confronted judges where acceptance has not been
communicated straightforwardly, and the approaches those judges
have adopted, before going on to attempt as clear a statement of the
current rule as seems reasonably practicable.
* Lecturer in Law, Lancaster University; e-mail r.austen-baker@lancaster.ac.uk. I
should like to thank Professor T.A. Downes (Reading University) and Professor
Geraint Howells (Lancaster University) for kindly reading the article in draft, and
for their valuable suggestions. Any remaining errors, omissions or infelicities that
remain are, of course, my own.
1 (1862) 11 CB (NS) 869; 142 ER 1037 (affirmed (1863) New Rep 401).
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II. The Rule in Felthouse v Bindley
Felthouse v Bindley was an action for conversion of a horse. In brief,
one John Felthouse instructed an auctioneer, Bindley, to sell his farm-
ing stock, but reserved a horse, which he informed the auctioneer he
had already sold. He had been in negotiations with the purchaser, his
uncle Paul Felthouse and each thought a sale had been agreed,
though, unsurprisingly, John thought the price was 30 guineas,
whereas Uncle Paul thought the price was 30 pounds. John wrote to
his uncle rather testily asserting 30 guineas as the price and Paul in
turn replied to his nephew offering to split the difference at £30.15s, in
the following terms:
Dear Nephew, – Your price, I admit, was 30 guineas. I offered 30l., –
never offered more: and you said the horse was mine. However, as there
may be a mistake about him, I will split the difference, – 30l. 15s. – I
paying all expenses from Tamworth. You can send him at your conven-
ience, between now and the 25th of March. If I hear no more about him,
I consider the horse mine at 30l. 15s.
John did not reply to this but instructed Bindley not to sell the horse.
Of course, Bindley went ahead and sold the horse anyway, for £33.
The purchaser refused to be tempted by the offer of £5 to give up the
horse. Paul Felthouse then sued Bindley for conversion. The action
was bound to succeed if Uncle Paul was the owner of the horse at the
time of the auction, but bound to fail if he was not. All depended on
whether there came into existence a contract for the sale of the horse
to Uncle Paul. There was some argument in court as to whether the
Statute of Frauds2 was satisfied, and as to the admissibility of a letter
written by John shortly after the sale, but the critical point seems to
have been whether any agreement had ever been reached at all, since
if one had not, then the question of whether sufficient memorandum
had been made to satisfy the Statute of Frauds would simply not arise.
The Court of Common Pleas (Willes, Byles and Keating JJ) unan-
imously rejected Paul’s contention that he had been the owner of the
horse at the time of its sale at auction by Bindley. The main judgment
was given by Willes J, who held as follows:
It is clear that there was no complete bargain on the 2nd of January
[when John and Paul had bargained face-to-face]: and it is also clear that
the uncle had no right to impose upon the nephew a sale of his horse for
30l. 15s. unless he chose to comply with the condition of writing to
repudiate the offer. The nephew might, no doubt, have bound his uncle
to the bargain by writing to him: the uncle might also have retracted his
offer at any time before acceptance. It stood an open offer: and so things
remained until the 25th of February, when the nephew was about to sell
his farming stock by auction. The horse in question being catalogued
with the rest of the stock, the auctioneer (the defendant) was told that it
was already sold. It is clear, therefore, that the nephew in his own mind
2 29 Car. 2, c.3.
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intended his uncle to have the horse at the price which he (the uncle)
had named – 30l. 15s.: but he had not communicated such his intention
to his uncle, or done anything to bind himself.3
Sir Guenter Treitel comments that the actual decision in the case is
‘hard to support’4 because in his view the nephew was not imposed
upon; rather, he was happy to accept the situation and regarded the
sale as agreed. In other words, the principle is correct—it is wrong to
allow an offeror to impose a duty to act or speak on an offeree (the
principle, also, of the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971), but
the result was wrong because the offeree did not in fact feel imposed
upon. Professor Miller, in the Modern Law Review,5 took the opposite
view: the decision was right, but only on the grounds that there was
insufficient evidence of an agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds;
there should be no principle excluding such imposition. Miller, how-
ever, muddies the water somewhat by citing, with apparent approval,
Lord Denning in Robophone Facilities v Blank 6 thus:
Signing without notification is not enough. It would be deplorable if it
were. The plaintiffs would be able to keep the form in their office un-
signed, and then play fast and loose as they pleased. The defendant
would not know whether or not there was a contract binding them to
supply or him to take. Just as mental acceptance is not enough, nor is
internal acceptance within the plaintiff’s office.7
The view that no communication of acceptance should be necessary,
so that an offeree can be bound willy-nilly unless he communicates his
unwillingness, is not wholly at odds with the view that an offeree
should on no account be allowed to benefit from his own silence, but
the two views held in combination point to them being held by some-
one who expects to make a lot of offers but not to receive too many. At
any rate, the net result looks quite unfavourable for offerees and
astonishingly generous to offerors; some might find such a situation
unjust as well as inconvenient. Whatever the rights and wrongs of it,
however, the rule in Felthouse v Bindley is as stated above, and is
familiar enough.8
3 11 CB (NS) 869 at 875–6.
4 G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 11th edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2003) 32.
5 C. J. Miller, ‘Felthouse v Bindley Re-Visited’ (1972) 35 MLR 489.
6 [1966] 3 All ER 128, cited in Miller, above n. 5 at 492. The question in this case was
whether the plaintiff could rely on a clause to the effect that a contract would
become effective when, and only when, its form had been signed on its behalf at its
offices.
7 Ibid. at 131–2.
8 It is, perhaps, interesting to reflect, when considering the human factor in the
process of case law development, that had it not been for the Statute of Frauds’
requirement for written evidence of a contract in this case, Paul and John
Felthouse might well have been tempted simply to assert that a deal had been
struck between them orally at the time of the original conversation, neglecting to
mention the subsequent correspondence, in which event this case might never
have got to trial, and would certainly not have provided the occasion for the
statement of an important rule of law.
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It is notable that nobody in Felthouse appears to have cited any
authority on the question of whether silence could amount to ac-
ceptance or not. The argument largely centred on the question of
whether sufficient memorandum had been made to pass title to the
uncle under the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Keating J
expressed the view that the case would have been difficult if it had
been between the uncle and the nephew, but only because subsequent
correspondence may have served to effect acceptance.9 In fact, it
seems as if the question of whether offers could be accepted by si-
lence had not previously arisen in a reported decision in the context of
the modern law of contracts. Weatherby v Banham10 is sometimes
cited11 for the proposition that there is a duty to speak out when
unsolicited benefits are received in circumstances wherein it must be
obvious that payment is expected. This, however, was not really a case
of silence in response to an offer (in the form of unsolicited copies of
the Racing Calendar), and the ‘offer’ did not come out of the blue.
Banham was the heir of a Mr Westbrook, who had a subscription to
the plaintiffs’ publication. After Mr Westbrook’s death, of which the
plaintiffs knew nothing, the defendant continued to receive the Cal-
endars12 and never offered to return them. Three observations nat-
urally arise. First, this case might today be pleaded in restitution.
Secondly, the judge, Lord Tenterden CJ, seems to have considered it
in terms of a liability of the estate: ‘These books come addressed to the
deceased gentleman, whose estate has come to the defendant, and he
keeps the books’.13 Thirdly, the action was, of course, one of assump-
sit, at a time when it had not yet undergone the rapid and radical
development into the modern law of contract described by Simpson
in the Law Quarterly Review and although agreement was doubtless
by then considered an important point (as is evident from the argu-
ment of the defendant’s counsel), the central notion was that of con-
sideration, of a benefit conferred and received.14
III. Silence Since Felthouse
The issue of silence in the context of agreement has arisen a number
of times since Felthouse v Bindley. A significant number of cases
9 11 CB (NS) 869 at 877.
10 (1823) 5 C & P 228.
11 E.g., J. Beatson, Anson’s Law of Contract, 28th edn (OUP: Oxford, 2002) 48.
12 A fact proved by the evidence of a servant, which only goes to show timelessness
of the adage that ‘you can’t get the staff nowadays’.
13 An additional point springs to mind, also: that counsel for the plaintiff was Pollock,
of whom Lord Tenterden was reputed to be terrified, so the reasoning may not
have been quite so important as the result.
14 A. W. B. Simpson, ‘Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law’ (1975) 91 LQR
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concern arbitration or its abandonment,15 or deal with unilateral con-
tracts,16 or else acceptance by conduct or in the absence of form.17 The
last two types of cases are not strictly in point so far as we are
concerned here, but some of the arbitration cases will be discussed as
these have given rise to general statements as to silence in bilateral
agreements. (A fully exhaustive study of the arbitration cases is, how-
ever, unnecessary and would shed little extra light on our subject.)
The decisions can, it is submitted, be divided into three categories: (1)
those where it was held that in some cases a ‘duty to speak’ arises
from the conduct of the parties or surrounding circumstances; (2)
those in which a particular promise is implied from the conduct of the
parties; and (3) cases in which the strict rule of Felthouse v Bindley
was applied.
i. A Duty to Speak
The Tennessee case of Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet Co v Holloway18 con-
cerned a contract for the sale and purchase of a quantity of meal.
Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet (‘CMN’) were dealers in meal, amongst other
things, and Holloway was a shopkeeper who usually ordered his sup-
plies of meal from CMN. In this instance, CMN’s salesman took Hollo-
way’s order for 50 barrels of meal but CMN later refused to honour
this order, the price of meal having risen in the meantime. Nothing
had been said to Holloway during this period (some two months), in
spite of the fact that CMN’s salesman called upon him as often as once
a week, their refusal being made only when Holloway, happening to
be at CMN’s place of business, asked them to begin deliveries. Now, it
was the practice of many such jobbers as CMN to treat contracts as
concluded if they did not notify rejection to the buyer. CMN, however,
had a contract providing that it was not binding until they had ac-
cepted it at their office in Memphis. The Supreme Court of Tennessee
(on a writ of error) held that unreasonable delay by CMN in sending
their acceptance (in this case, never) amounted in itself to acceptance,
especially in view of the ongoing relationship between the parties. As
Landen CJ explained:
It is undoubtedly true that an offer to buy or sell is not binding until its
acceptance is communicated to the other party. The acceptance, how-
ever, of such an offer, may be communicated by the other party either by
15 See, e.g., The Splendid Sun [1981] QB 694; The Hannah Blumenthal [1983] AC 854;
The Leonidas D [1985] 1 WLR 925; Cie Française v Deutsche [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
592; Gebr. Van Weelde v CN Sea Orient [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 496 (reversed by The
Agrabele [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223); The Anticlizo [1988] 1 WLR 603; and The Golden
Bear [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 330.
16 See, e.g., Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256; Spencer v Harding (1870)
LR 5 CP 561; and Alexander Hamilton Institute v Jones 234 Ill App 444 (1924).
17 See, e.g., Brogden v Metropolitan Rly (1876) 2 App Cas 666 and Way & Waller v
Ryde [1944] 1 All ER 9.
18 214 SW 817 (1919).
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a formal acceptance, or acts amounting to an acceptance. Delay in com-
municating action as to the acceptance may amount to acceptance
itself.19
The reason for such an approach was that someone in CMN’s position
could solicit offers and, when these were received, could wait to see
how the market went from then until the anticipated time of delivery
and then elect either to hold the buyer to the contract, or, if market
conditions made the deal unfavourable, to walk away scot-free.20
Of course, the offeror in such an instance (i.e. the person whose
order has been solicited) is free to withdraw his offer at any time, if
the market went the other way. In reality, however, this would not
equalize the situation. Acceptance in the CMN case was to take place
at their offices in Memphis,21 implying that communication of it may
take place sometime after occurrence of the prescribed act of ac-
ceptance, so that communication of the withdrawal may be too late,
and the offeror would only have the offeree’s say-so as to when ac-
ceptance occurred. Clearly, then, this would be a minefield both prac-
tically and conceptually (since acceptance is supposed to be
communicated, but CMN’s terms of trading suggested otherwise).
In the circumstances, it seems rational to suggest that, where there
has been an ongoing contractual relationship, in a volatile market, a
duty to communicate rejection may arise, with acceptance being in-
ferred where a reasonable time had elapsed in which to communicate.
What would amount to a reasonable time could be dealt with as a
matter of fact in each individual case. Objections to this approach will
become apparent later in this article, and we will also discuss the idea
that delay may in itself be considered an act. What might be said now
is that such inferences might best be confined to vertical processes of
ordering allowed for under what might be called an ‘umbrella con-
tract’. That is to say, that the parties already have a contract, expressly
agreed to, under which orders may be placed, rejection of which
orders, if permitted, must be communicated within either a specified
time or a reasonable time. Conceptual difficulties of assent might arise
if such a rule were applied where no such umbrella contract exists.
One final point worthy of note, is that in Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet the
delay itself was said to constitute an act (see the quotation from the
judgment of Lansden CJ, set out above). As will be seen shortly, this is
important from a taxonomical point of view.
ii. An Implied Promise from Conduct
This category is very close to the preceding one. But in Cole-McIntyre-
Norfleet and any case like it, the inference comes from the absence of
communication in a situation where a positive duty to speak has been
19 Ibid. at 818.
20 Ibid.
21 Today, in England, of course, this would certainly not do: see dictum of Lord
Denning MR in Robophone Facilities v Blank, quoted above at text to n. 7.
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said to have arisen or to exist in the nature of the business and an
undue delay in speaking becomes the executive action. In the category
of decision we will now examine, there is not, as such, said to be a
duty to speak. One may or may not, but whatever one does (speak or
not) an inference may be drawn as to intention. In these cases, too, the
unifying feature is that the conduct held to amount to acceptance is
mere inaction, as opposed to acting positively in a way consistent only
with acceptance, as for instance in Brogden v Metropolitan Railway,22
in which the actions of both parties in carrying on as if the contract
was in force, or in Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd,23 where the offeree’s conduct
(to a third party selling the propane the offeror had offered to buy),
consistent only with acceptance of the offeror’s telexed repudiation,
was taken as acceptance of the repudiation.
Three cases will be examined here: Saint John Tugboat Co v Irving
Refinery Ltd;24 Rust v Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd;25 and Wettern
Electric Ltd v Welsh Development Agency.26
In Saint John Tugboat the plaintiff supplied tugs for the use of Kent
Lines, a company owned by the defendant, operating oil tankers deliv-
ering to the defendant’s refinery. When the ‘season’ came to an end,
the plaintiff wrote to Kent Lines to say that only two tugs (of the less
powerful variety) would be available over the coming months. The
plaintiff also wrote to the defendant, copying this letter, and offering
to have one of two powerful steam tugs available at a standby rate of
C$450 per day, whether or not they were used. The director who
received this letter did not reply in writing, but did agree orally to the
arrangement in respect of the first month. Later he extended this to a
second month. The tug was used during those two months. Invoices
continued to be sent during the following months, but the defendant
neither paid them nor objected to them.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the defendant had ac-
cepted the plaintiff’s offer by its conduct. It is easy enough to see why.
The dealing up to then and the very nature of the deal—that the tugs
were to be paid for whether or not they were used—meant that this
could be the only reasonable inference for a party in the position of
the plaintiff. Ritchie J, delivering the judgment of the court, com-
mented at paragraph 23:
Like the learned trial judge . . . I would adopt the following excerpt from
Smith’s Leading Cases, 13th ed. at p.156 where it is said: ‘But if a person
knows that the consideration is being rendered for his benefit with an
expectation that he will pay for it, then if he acquiesces in its being done,
taking the benefit of it when done, he will be taken impliedly to have
requested its being done: and that will import a promise to pay for it’.
22 (1876) 2 App. Cas 666.
23 [1996] AC 800.
24 (1964) 46 DLR (2d) 1.
25 [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 334.
26 [1983] QB 796.
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This seems unnecessary to the general reasoning of the judgment,
however, and imports gratuitous confusion. The true basis for this
decision appears to be that, from the conduct of the defendant, the
plaintiff will necessarily have inferred acceptance of its offer. In fact,
the judgment is generally quite confused. Ritchie J also refers27 to
Williston on Contracts (3rd edn) I, paragraph 91A, that ‘[s]ilence may
be so deceptive that it may become necessary . . . to speak in order to
escape the inference of a promise to pay . . .’. This, if it were the true
ratio of the decision, would put Saint John Tugboat into our first
category, and yet, in only the previous paragraph, Ritchie J cited Lord
Blackburn’s famous dictum in Smith v Hughes:
If, whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a
reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms pro-
posed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters
into a contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be
equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party’s terms.28
The problems here are obvious. The point of Smith v Hughes is that
whether or not one can demonstrate the inward intention of a con-
tracting party (obviously a difficult business at the best of times), the
outward appearance of wishing to accept will suffice to establish ac-
ceptance. Saint John Tugboat could be looked at in that light, but this
is quite different from duty-to-speak scenarios. With respect, the
learned judge appears to have confounded two quite different lines
of reasoning. It is submitted that the best analysis of Saint John
Tugboat is that the defendant’s conduct in using the standby tugs,
paying the invoices on the basis of the proferred terms (i.e. C$450
per day, irrespective of whether used or not) would cause any rea-
sonable person to suppose that the defendant had indeed accepted
the plaintiff’s offer.29
A rather better-known case is Rust v Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd.30
This concerned an investment in a ‘property bond’. Mrs Rust sold her
London hotel, ‘The Georgian House’ in Gloucester Place W1, for
£75,000 in 1973. Added to her existing funds, this brought her balance
at the National Westminster Bank to somewhat over £90,000. A friend
suggested that she ought to invest it in property bonds, and intro-
duced her to the second defendant, an insurance agent by the name of
27 (1964) 46 DLR (2d)1 at para. 20.
28 (1871) LR 6 QB 597 at 607.
29 It is interesting, perhaps, to note that the defendant had in the past obtained the
use of tugs of its own, but the harbour pilots had declined to make use of them, or
otherwise made difficulties over their use. It does not require a huge leap of the
imagination to suppose that established tug-owners, including the plaintiff, here
had sought the cooperation of the pilots in protecting their business against such
as the defendant who wanted to make its own arrangements. In these
circumstances, is it not possible that the defendant was hoping in some way to ‘get
its own back’ on the plaintiff?
30 [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 334.
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Mr Clive Prentice, who recommended the Abbey Life investment (es-
sentially a tax-efficient property investment with added life insur-
ance). Mr Prentice met with Mrs Rust’s accountant and explained the
investment to him. The accountant recommended the investment to
Mrs Rust, who informed her bank manager of her intentions, and
completed an application form. The bank manager was concerned at
the idea of investing such a large proportion of her money (some
£91,600) in one investment. Mr Prentice explained the investment to
the bank manager and, seeing that Mrs Rust was determined on this
course of action, he withdrew his objections. Thereupon, Mrs Rust
made out a cheque to Abbey Life in the sum of £91,600, which sum
was also entered on the application form, which was dated 1 October
1973. The form and the cheque were passed by Mr Prentice to Abbey
Life. Abbey Life wrote to Mrs Rust on 9 October, acknowledging her
application and informing her that, subject to approval by the com-
pany, her policy would be issued in two or three weeks’ time. The
letter further stated that at that point units in the property bond would
be issued to her at a specified unit price, set on 2 October. On 26
October, the company issued the policy and sent it by registered post,
so that Mrs Rust received it a day or two later. There were also details
of the Abbey Single Premium Property Bond Policy, dated 2 October
(units were valued monthly on the first Tuesday of the month (on that
occasion, 3 October) and, presumably for the sake of certainty and on
the assumption that they would rise steadily in value, it was desired by
Mrs Rust (on the advice of Mr Prentice) to be allocated units at the
price prevailing on 1 October. By May 1974 the unit values had de-
creased considerably, to the understandable dissatisfaction of Mrs
Rust, who then entered into dispute with Abbey Life. Obtaining no
satisfaction, she commenced her action against both Abbey Life and
Mr Prentice.
Part of her case alleged what today we would call ‘misselling’, and
involved an allegation of negligence against Mr Prentice. The argu-
ment which concerns us here, however, was that she had never en-
tered into a contract with Abbey Life. On this issue, the Deputy Judge
in the Queen’s Bench Division (C. M. Clothier QC) held that a contract
had been concluded. He gave two alternative bases for this decision.
Either Mrs Rust’s application with her cheque constituted an offer
which was then accepted by Abbey Life either by allocating units in
the property bond or else by issuing or else by posting the policy
dated 26 October; or, alternatively, Abbey Life made an offer to Mrs
Rust in the form of the policy which it posted to her and which she
accepted by doing nothing for some seven months.
Brandon LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, raised
and dismissed a problem with the first basis, relating to Mrs Rust not
having seen the detailed terms of the offer,31 but this need not concern
31 Ibid. at 339.
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us here. It is submitted, however, that acceptance cannot have been
effectuated by allocating the units or by issuing the policy, either of
which would constitute acceptance in the defendant’s office, ruled out
in Robophone Facilities v Blank,32 which does not appear to have been
brought to the attention of the Court of Appeal.33 The posting of the
policy, on the other hand, would be an unproblematic event of ac-
ceptance. It is submitted that the decision can be explained on that
ground, and that there was really no basis for Brandon LJ’s observa-
tion that ‘[t]here is room for considerable argument as to which of
those three acts or events constituted an acceptance’,34 or for the Lord
Justice’s comment that ‘. . . if I had to express a view provisionally on
the matter I would prefer to say that the issue of the policy constituted
acceptance’.35 It follows, of course, that the case could be disposed of
without resort to discovering acceptance in Mrs Rust’s silence. Al-
though Brandon LJ was willing to dispose of the matter on the basis
that acceptance had been by Abbey Life, somehow, in response to an
offer from Mrs Rust, he went on to hold in the alternative that Abbey
had made the offer and Mrs Rust had accepted it by seven months of
silence:
While it may well be that in many cases silence or inactivity is not
evidence of acceptance, having regard to the facts of this case and the
history of the transaction between the parties as previously set out, it
seems to me to be an inevitable inference from the conduct of the
plaintiff in doing and saying nothing for seven months that she accepted
the policy as a valid contract between herself and the first defendants.36
This raises, first, the nice issue of whether his comments on this point
are or are not obiter. On the one hand, the outcome of the appeal did
not depend on a finding that Mrs Rust (or anyone) could accept by
silence, since he had already found that Abbey had accepted her offer
in one of the ways described. On the other hand, Brandon LJ ex-
pressly describes this as an alternative ground for dismissing the
appeal, so it may be said that it is no more obiter than his first ground.
Professor Halson regards this alternative reasoning as obiter,37 but the
present author is not so sure. Giving judgment on alternative grounds
is tantamount to saying that if, on further appeal, one ground is struck
down, the appeal does not necessarily succeed, since the alternative
32 See above at text to n. 7.
33 Mrs Rust was unrepresented on appeal, which may explain this omission, but
neither was it mentioned in the Deputy Judge’s judgment in the Queen’s Bench
Division, at which hearing Mrs Rust was represented by F. J. Marr-Johnson of
counsel. The defendants were, however, represented in the Court of Appeal by Mr
J. Steyn (now Lord Steyn), who ought, perhaps, to have drawn the court’s attention
to Robophone, though it was clearly unfavourable to the defendants’ case.
34 [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 334 at 340.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 R. Halson, Contract Law (Longman: Harlow and London, 2001) 154.
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ground remains operative and has also to be dealt with by the su-
perior tribunal. This is quite different from saying ‘I hold X, but had
circumstances been different I should have held Y’. In short, had Mrs
Rust appealed to the House of Lords, her grounds of appeal could not
have neglected to mention Brandon LJ’s alternative basis, whilst ap-
pellants may safely ignore obiter dicta in framing appeal notices.
Whatever might be the answer to this question, there are funda-
mental problems with finding Mrs Rust’s silence as acceptance.
When, for instance, did acceptance occur? Was it after seven months?
Or after six months, or five months, or fourteen days? This is no mere
academic quibble: in a sale of goods case, the matter might be abso-
lutely essential. At whose risk were the goods at any given time? Who
owned the goods when the seller (or indeed, the buyer) ‘sold’ them on
to someone else? Imagine A is interested in selling a painting to B and
suggests B should have it at home and ‘live with it for a bit’. B, an
inveterate ditherer, simply cannot make up his mind. The days go by,
the weeks go by. At what point does his silent retention of the paint-
ing lead to an ‘inevitable inference’ that he has accepted A’s offer? Let
us say that after a couple of months, B decides on, say, 15 May that he
does not want to keep the picture and telephones to A to tell him so.
Can A say that he drew an inevitable inference of B’s acceptance of
the painting on 14 May and that it is now too late to reject the offer of
the painting? Alternatively, if B decides on 15 May that he does want
the painting, and tells A so, if A replies that he assumed B did not
want it and sold it sight unseen to C on 14 May, will it be in B’s mouth
to say that A should have drawn an inevitable inference of acceptance
on, say, 13 May? Even if these were purely theoretical issues, the
scholar should be concerned with them; since, however, they are quite
likely to happen in real life, and require legal advice and perhaps
judgment, scholars, practitioners and judges alike must address them.
Nor is it good enough for the judiciary to say, ‘Well, we shall know a
silent acceptance by inevitable inference from conduct when we see
one’: business people need some sort of certainty, as do legal advisers,
without having inevitable recourse to the courts in every such case.
In Wettern Electric Ltd v Welsh Development Agency,38 the reason-
ing is a little easier to appreciate than the second basis in Rust. In this
case the plaintiffs, a manufacturer of electrical junction boxes, were
lessees under a 21-year lease of a factory owned by the defendants.
The plaintiffs found themselves in need of extra space and agreed
with the defendants for the building of a 10,000 sq ft extension (dou-
bling the size of the premises). In the meantime, the defendants of-
fered a 12-month licence on a 4,500 sq ft unit at that time in the course
of construction on the same industrial estate. After some to-ing and
fro-ing, the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs on 21st June 1979 for-
mally offering a licence on ‘unit 7’ from 25 June 1979 to 24 June 1980.
38 [1983] QB 796.
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The letter stated that ‘[if] you accept this licence on the above terms
will you please complete the acknowledgement and acceptance at the
foot of the enclosed copy and return it to us at your earliest conven-
ience’. Without completing or returning the copy, the plaintiffs moved
in on 25 June, installing plant and machinery, and on 26 June wrote to
the defendants asking if they would agree to extend the licence if the
extension were not completed on time, to which the defendants did
not initially reply. The plaintiffs sent a reminder on 27 July and the
defendants replied by letter dated 30 July that they did not grant
licences of more than a year’s duration.
From August onwards, the unit began to fall to bits, becoming, by
November, too dangerous to occupy. On 31 October the defendants
wrote to the plaintiffs asking for approval of the ‘draft licence’ of 21
June. The defendants repeated this request on 14 December, some
time after the plaintiffs had abandoned the precarious premises. The
plaintiffs replied on 19 December, enclosing the approved, but un-
dated document, and stating that the original terms were in order. In
the meantime, the plaintiffs had rented alternative premises, also from
the defendant, about 20 miles distant. On 14 December 1981 the plain-
tiffs started their action, their main claim being in respect of the costs
incurred as a result of having part of their operations located so far
from their main base.
For our purposes, the case turned on whether or not a contractual
licence to occupy unit 7 had ever come into being. Clearly, since the
offer prescribed the mode of acceptance, there was no contract made
as such on the basis of the offer letter. But Judge John Newey QC
(sitting as a judge of the Queen’s Bench Division) held that the plain-
tiffs occupied the premises not on the basis of a gratuitous permission
(as argued for the defendants) but on the basis of a contractual licence
which came into being in one of two ways, as follows. (1) By entering
into the premises on 25 June, the plaintiffs offered to enter into a
contractual licence on the terms set out in the defendants’ offer (ob-
viously excepting the mode of acceptance) and by suffering them to
remain there the defendants accepted this offer. (2) The plaintiffs
made their offer by moving in, on the basis that terms would be
negotiated later, and the defendants accepted by permitting the de-
fendants to remain.
The second possibility is unappealing, in that it seems to leave far
too much uncertainty as to crucial terms (including the length of the
licence) and would thus amount to an agreement to agree. The first
approach gains some support, it is submitted, from the defendants’
letter of 30 July, which certainly seems to imply their consent to the
occupation of the premises by the plaintiffs and their assumption that
such occupation is in accordance with the terms of the licence. In so
far as the letter did not purport to grant such a licence, it seems
reasonable to infer that they considered a licence to be in existence
and that the request was for a variation to an existing agreement.
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They even went as far as to state that if there were delays to the
building works on the extension, they would be sympathetic to a
request for a further licence. All of the inferences here, though, can be
drawn from actual conduct: moving in; writing a letter implicitly as-
suming the existence of a licence. The reminders sent regarding the
acceptance, so far as we know from the reported details, suggest that
the defendants were merely concerned to have all the formalities in
order, otherwise why write on 14 December, long after the plaintiffs
had abandoned unit 7, asking for completed paperwork? In this re-
spect, the case may be likened more to Brogden v Metropolitan Rail-
way, where the parties conducted themselves as if they considered a
contract to be in force, though the written formalities had not been
completed, than to an instance of alleged acceptance by silence.
iii. Cases in which the Rule in Felthouse v Bindley was
Strictly Applied
Three cases are here considered as illustrative of application of the
rule in Felthouse v Bindley, namely Fairline Shipping Corporation v
Adamson,39 Financial Techniques (Planning Services) Ltd v Hughes,40
and Collin v Duke of Westminster.41 These cases need not detain us at
length, naturally, since they are inherently unproblematic, being ap-
plications of the accepted general rule. Nonetheless, they are worth a
brief examination.
The first of these cases concerned a contract for the storage of a
ship’s provisions in a cold store. Fairline agreed with Game & Meat
Products Ltd to store the former’s provisions in a cold store in South-
ampton used by the latter. The cold store was actually owned by the
defendant, Adamson, who was managing director of Game & Meat, a
company that was by then ‘on the rocks’, unbeknown to Fairline.
Because of the failure of part of the refrigeration apparatus, the provi-
sions were spoiled. Game & Meat having become insolvent, Fairline
sued Adamson in the Queen’s Bench Division (1) for breach of con-
tract, (2) as a bailee, and (3) for negligence. Kerr J held in their favour
on the basis of Adamson’s negligence, but against them on bailment
and breach of contract. The bailment and negligence points do not
concern us here. The contract allegation was based on the fact that,
after they had put the goods into the store, the plaintiffs received a
letter from the defendant, on his own writing paper, purporting to
confirm the arrangment, and were subsequently invoiced in terms
that indicated that Adamson regarded the arrangement as one be-
tween Fairline and himself (no doubt to keep the money away from
Game & Meat’s creditors).
39 [1975] QB 180.
40 [1981] IRLR 32.
41 [1985] QB 581.
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Kerr J was prepared to consider the argument that the defendant’s
letter amounted to an offer of a novation of the contract, substituting
himself for Game & Meat, but could find no evidence of acceptance by
Fairline’s agent, Keller Bryant & Co Ltd, even though the latter had
not raised any query or objection and a director gave evidence that
had events not overtaken it, a cheque settling the invoice would have
been drawn in favour of the defendant personally.42 His lordship com-
mented in the following terms:
Faced with the difficulty of showing any acceptance of the terms of
these documents by Keller Bryant, and the decision in Felthouse v
Bindley . . . that silence cannot amount to an acceptance, [the plaintiffs]
sought to overcome this in the following manner. They submitted that
the letter of March 23, followed by the despatch of the invoice on April
14, showed that the defendant intended or was content to treat Keller
Bryant’s silence as an acceptance of his having taken over the original
contract with Game & Meat, and that this contract was accordingly
thereafter binding upon him. In this connection they relied on the com-
ment on Felthouse v Bindley in Chitty on Contracts, 23rd ed. (1968) vol. 1,
art. 57 where it is suggested, as I understand it, that in such circum-
stances the offeror (the defendant) may be bound to the offeree (Keller
Bryant as agents for the plaintiffs) even though he himself might not be
able to hold the offeree to any contract. It seems to me, however, that
such a result can only flow from an estoppel operating against the
offeror and that such facts cannot give rise to any contract, or fit into the
settled law governing offer and acceptance.43
This, then, was a straightforward application of the rule, which was
stated to be that ‘silence cannot amount to acceptance’, a point which
is significant for our present purposes and to which we will return in
the concluding section of this article. It should also be noted at this
point, and remembered for future reference, that this was not a case
of an attempt by an offeror to impose silence as a mode of acceptance:
indeed, Adamson does not appear to have addressed his mind to the
point at all, until he was sued.
In Financial Techniques (Planning Services) Ltd v Hughes,44 Mr
Hughes had been employed by the company as a financial adviser on
a salary and bonus scheme. The dispute related to payments under the
latter when Mr Hughes left to work for another firm. The company
maintained that it had, during the course of Mr Hughes’ employment,
changed the terms of the bonus scheme and that his claim failed
under the new terms, which were expressed not to be legally binding.
The Court of Appeal (Lawton, Brandon and Templeman LJJ) held on
this point that although Mr Hughes was aware that the scheme had
been revised and continued working under it anyway, this silence on
his part could not be taken to indicate acceptance of the revised
42 [1975] QB 180 at 188–9.
43 Ibid. at 189 (emphasis supplied).
44 [1981] IRLR 32.
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scheme. Lawton LJ commented that ‘[s]ilence seldom amounts to con-
senting to new terms . . . therefore . . . there was no evidence upon
which the Industrial Tribunal properly could have [found that Mr
Hughes had done so]’.45 His lordship did not, however, expatiate on
the circumstances in which silence does amount to consenting to new
terms. It should, perhaps, be noted here that carrying on working
clearly may amount to ‘conduct’, but it is, at best, highly equivocal
when it is no different from prior conduct.
Last but not least in this category is the case of Collin v Duke of
Westminster.46 Mr Collin lived at 30 Eaton Terrace, Belgravia, held on
a lease of 481⁄2 years from December 1948. In 1975 he asserted a claim
to buy the freehold under the terms of the Leasehold Reform Act
1967.47 The estate rejected the claim on the grounds that Mr Collin’s
ground rent did not qualify as a ‘low rent’ and referring to the 1967
Act, s. 4(1). In November and again in December 1976, Mr Collin
wrote to the estate’s surveyor asking whether it would consider sell-
ing him the freehold anyway. Again, by letter dated 11 March 1977,
the estate declined. Then nothing was heard until 6 July 1981, when,
following the decision in Manson v Duke of Westminster,48 which
shewed that Mr Collin’s claim was indeed within the 1967 Act, his
agent revived the claim. The Duke’s defence was that Mr Collin had
abandoned his claim and could not now revive it. There was nothing
in the 1967 Act that prevented contractually giving up the right to
enfranchisement.
The Court of Appeal (Oliver and May LJJ and Sir Roger Ormrod)
held that, although Mr Collin’s letters asking whether the estate would
consider the sale of the freehold outside the terms of the 1967 Act and
his subsequent silence in the face of the estate’s refusal might amount
to an offer to abandon a claim to enfranchisement under the 1967 Act,
there was nothing from which one could infer any counterpromise
(or, of course, consideration) from the estate, and, if one looked at the
estate’s rejection of the notice as a repudiation of the statutory con-
tract created by Mr Collin’s notice, the latter’s silence over the next six
years did not amount to acceptance of such repudiation, as indeed it
could not under the strict rule in Felthouse v Bindley (though this case
was not actually referred to in the judgment or even cited in argument
in the Court of Appeal). At this point, it will suffice to observe that
seven months had been enough in Rust, decided six years before the
instant case, but not referred to in Collin.
At about the same time as Collin was being decided, a differently
constituted Court of Appeal was considering the case of Allied Marine
45 Ibid. at 35.
46 [1985] QB 581.
47 An Act designed to allow rich men like Mr Collin to pay a nominal sum to strip
even richer men like the Duke of Westminster of their rightful property in the
shape of the freeholds of the great estates established by their ancestors.
48 [1981] QB 323.
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Transport Ltd v Vale do Rio Doce Navegacao SA (The ‘Leonidas D’).49
The issue here was whether the charterers of a ship, by their silence,
had agreed to the abandonment of an arbitration concerning costs
incurred by the charterers owing to alleged unfitness of the vessel’s
holds for grain cargoes. In essence, nothing was done to progress the
arbitration between 1976, when the dispute arose, and 1978. In 1978
there was some correspondence suggesting that it was unlikely that
the arbitration would proceed. From then, little passed until 1981. In
the High Court, Mustill J held that the arbitration had been aban-
doned by (silent) agreement.50 The charterers appealed. The Court of
Appeal (Griffiths, Robert Goff and Stephen Brown LJJ) allowed the
appeal, rejecting the contention that silence could amount to accep-
tance. Robert Goff LJ, delivering the judgment of the court, com-
mented that the suggestion that silence could amount to acceptance
was ‘most surprising’. He continued, ‘We have all been brought up to
believe it to be axiomatic that acceptance of an offer cannot be in-
ferred from silence, save in the most exceptional circumstances’.51
Professor Treitel suggests that ‘exceptional circumstances’ might be
illustrated by The Splendid Sun,52 but avers that in that case accep-
tance may have been by conduct and that it is ‘hard to reconcile with
the Leonidas D’.53 In any event, the court in the Leonidas D was aware
of the decision in Collin, and cited with approval the approach of
Oliver LJ in that case.54
IV. Restating the Position on Silence
Let us then, in conclusion, consider a possible statement of this aspect
of the doctrine of acceptance. Acceptance itself, of course, is an act of
volition by the offeree. Generally, an offeree is taken to accept if an-
other person would have reasonably taken him to have accepted,
since the law cannot conveniently depend on mind-reading. This is
the meaning of the objective test of agreement. The rule in Felthouse v
Bindley does not concern acceptance as such, but rather the required
communication of acceptance. Communication of acceptance in the
law of contract is like a sacrament in Christian theology: an outward
and visible sign of an inward and invisible grace. Just as the grace of
baptism does not become effective without the outward signs of the
application of water and the utterance of appropriate words, so ac-
ceptance, usually conceptualized as a state of the offeree’s mind, does
49 [1985] 1 WLR 925.
50 [1984] 1 WLR 1.
51 [1985] 1 WLR 925 at 937.
52 [1981] QB 694.
53 Above n. 4 at 32 n. 47.
54 [1985] 1 WLR 925 at 941.
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not become effective until it is communicated.55 This is still rather
unsatisfactory in some ways. Is it the case that acceptance is an in-
ward, mental act, which then needs to be communicated in order to
effectuate agreement, or is it rather that communication is itself a
constituent of acceptance? The dictum of Lord Blackburn in Smith v
Hughes to the effect that it is (generally speaking) appearance that
counts, while very satisfactory from a perspective of practical justice
does, from a theoretical perspective, confuse things further, unless we
are prepared to adopt a rather different way of looking at agreement
and say, not that an offer needs to be met by an acceptance, but that an
offer needs to be met by a communication of assent, so that the commu-
nication becomes the thing itself. Perhaps it would be better if the text-
book writers dispensed with ‘offer and acceptance’ in favour of ‘offer
and apparent acceptance’ or ‘offer and communication of assent’.
However that may be, a working definition which allows us to
conclude in any given case that an agreement either has or has not
been concluded will generally suffice. One could state the rule as to
the rôle of silence in the communication of acceptance in the follow-
ing terms. Silence per se cannot amount to communication of ac-
ceptance of an offer so as to satisfy the agreement requirement for a
valid contract. In some cases, a course of conduct, taken as a whole
and viewed objectively may be taken to be a sufficient ‘communica-
tion’ by inevitable inference of an intention by the offeree to accept
the offer, which inference could have been invalidated by an act of
verbal communication by the offeree. Where no such contrary com-
munication has been made by the relevant point in time (e.g. when the
offeror reasonably relies on the inevitable inference of the offeree’s
acceptance), the inference stands. Examples of such conduct might
include the retention of the subject-matter of the offer or of docu-
ments the custody of which would imply to an observer that the
possessor is a party to the relevant contract (e.g. a certificate of in-
surance). Professor Treitel puts the matter in this way:
In Roberts v Hayward [(1828) 3 C & P 432] a tenant accepted his land-
lord’s offer of a new tenancy at an increased rent by simply staying on
the premises. It was held that he had accepted the landlord’s offer by
silence; but it seems better to say that he accepted by conduct and that
the landlord waived notice of acceptance.56
It will be noted that the above does not incorporate the notion of a
‘duty to speak’, one of our three categories. It is submitted that the
notion should be rejected. First, one has to question how such a duty
55 That perverse deviation, the ‘postal rule’ of acceptance is, of course, an exception
to this, but was clearly established on pragmatic rather than principled grounds. It
must be questionable whether it should still survive today, when the post is so
much slower and less reliable than in the nineteenth century, and when
instantaneous means of communication over distance have become so wide
ranging and accessible.
56 Above n. 4 at 35.
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arises. Does it arise contractually? If so, under what contract? Surely
not the contract that can only come into being if the ‘duty’ is ne-
glected. Does it, then, arise in tort? No such suggestion is to be found
in the pages of Winfield and Jolowicz57 or Salmond & Heuston.58 A
number of the cases discussed above involve courses of conduct
which will lead to an inference of acceptance, if the offeree does not
act (speak) to dispel an offeror’s understandable, indeed ‘inevitable’
misapprehension as to the offeree’s intentions. This does not, how-
ever, amount to silence itself being a communication of acceptance,
nor does it point to some sort of duty to speak. In that respect, then,
we must doubt the dictum of Evans J in The Agrabele that: ‘The
significance of silence, as a matter of law, may also be different when
there is an express undertaking or an implied obligation to speak, in
the special circumstances of the particular case’.59 Alternatively, it
may be that his lordship had in mind the necessity, in some cases, of
speaking, if inferences from conduct are to be avoided. This seems a
happier way of putting the matter.
The case of Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet,60 considered above under sec-
tion III(i), still presents us with a problem. It is submitted that, so far as
the case suggested that there is such a duty, it was wrongly decided.
Certainly there is little evidence of it being followed in jurisdictions
other than Tennessee, let alone in England and Wales. The situation
might better have been analysed in terms of the plaintiff-in-error’s
salesman soliciting unilateral offers. Such a situation may not have
been ideal for the purchaser, but there were other jobbers operating
in the area who contracted on a different basis, and the adage that
hard cases make bad law is an old one, of which the Supreme Court of
Tennessee ought to have been aware.
Another case demanding our attention is In re Selectmove Ltd.61
This was a case where a company proposed terms to the Inland Reve-
nue regarding the repayment of PAYE contributions. The tax inspec-
tor indicated that he did not himself have authority to approve the
proposal and would refer it to his superior. He would, he said, revert
to the company if the proposal was unacceptable to the Revenue. He
never did revert to the company in this regard, and it was argued for
Selectmove that this had amounted to acceptance of the proposal.
This suggestion was dismissed on the ground that the inspector
clearly indicated that he did not have authority to bind the Revenue in
respect of the offer in question, so, in the circumstances, nothing he
said or did thereafter (unless he subsequently claimed authority)
57 W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 17th edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London,
2006).
58 R.F.V. Heuston and R.A. Buckley, Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts, 21st edn
(Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1996).
59 Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaartkantor BV v Compania Naviera Sea Orient [1985] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 496 at 509.
60 214 SW 817 (1919).
61 [1995] 1 WLR 474.
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would be capable of amounting to acceptance. The case gains its
interest for us here in the following obiter dictum of Peter Gibson LJ:
Where the offeree himself indicates that an offer is to be taken as ac-
cepted if he does not indicate to the contrary by an ascertainable time,
he is undertaking to speak if he does not want an agreement to be
concluded. I see no reason in principle why that should not be an excep-
tional circumstance such that the offer can be accepted by silence.62
This immediately followed an express acceptance by the Lord Justice
of the remarks of Evans J in The Agrabele.63 As already noted, how-
ever, the present author respectfully differs on this point, and the
Court of Appeal in In re Selectmove did not have to decide it.
It has been suggested to this author that where the offeree suggests
that his silence be taken as acceptance, imposing upon himself the
necessity of speaking, certainty is increased for the offeror, since the
original offeror can withdraw the offer at any time up to the stated
date or otherwise know that he has a deal when the date passes. This
has some merit, though it is not entirely satisfactory, since some un-
certainty remains as the offeree may speak to accept or reject une-
quivocally in the meantime. Nevertheless, it is submitted that it did not
matter in Felthouse v Bindley that it was the offeror who suggested
silence as the mode of effecting acceptance. What the court found
unacceptable was not ‘imposition’ on an offeree, but the notion of
silence as communication at all; and this is intuitively appealing in the
light of common notions of ‘communication’. The question which im-
mediately obtrudes itself when considering Peter Gibson LJ’s dictum
is what the outcome might be if A makes an offer to B, and B re-
sponds, ‘If you don’t hear from me to the contrary by noon on Friday,
you can consider it a deal’. Here the offeree is not imposed upon and
has taken upon himself the burden of speaking if he does not wish to
be bound. Now, suppose B decides on Thursday afternoon that he
does indeed want to proceed, and decides therefore to remain silent
until after noon on Friday, but A decides on Thursday evening that he
does not want to go ahead with the deal after all and communicates
this fact to B. The first-year law student will immediately recall
Dunmore v Alexander,64 not to mention Dickinson v Dodds.65 An of-
feror may withdraw his offer at any time before acceptance, though
the withdrawal must come to the offeree’s notice to take effect.
All very straightforward, and yet Peter Gibson LJ relies on the
offeree’s original communication as raising a duty to speak, so the
original communication must have some contractual effect. But what
effect can it have with no contract in being? One way of analysing the
above scenario is to see B’s response as a counteroffer: ‘I like the deal
62 [1995] 1 WLR 474 at 478.
63 See above at text to n. 59.
64 (1830) 8 Shaw 190.
65 (1876) 2 ChD 463.
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you are suggesting and am content to see it mature into a contract
unless I think better of it by Friday noon and inform you accordingly’.
In that case, however, B is no longer the offeree but the offeror, so this
is not a case of the offeree suggesting communication of acceptance
by silence, so the scenario does not fall within Peter Gibson LJ’s
suggested rule. Moreover, it is submitted that this analysis is the
better view. It is trite law that an acceptance must ‘mirror’ the offer,
and specific means of communicating acceptance form part of the
terms of an offer. A proposal by the offeree that what the courts are
agreed is at most an ‘exceptional’ mode of acceptance should apply,
is surely the addition of a term, which makes the statement a coun-
teroffer in the terms suggested above, which then must be accepted
by the offeree (i.e. the original offeror). If he is to accept by silence,
however, how is this situation arrived at if he does not volunteer to
do so by making yet another counteroffer or accepting by some
positive communication, which then breaks the never ending circle
of counteroffers?
The problem above seems logically insurmountable, and it is there-
fore submitted that the (re)statement offered above is the most sat-
isfactory one justifiable in the light of the relevant case law, properly
interpreted, and that otherwise we are tending towards a conceptual
mess. Indeed, the law might well benefit from some simplification and
clarification; indeed it might be improved by becoming more ‘clas-
sical’, one instance being, the question of whether conduct should be
capable of amounting to acceptance. Undoubtedly it is so capable, but
the matter hardly seems satisfactory, especially in the light of Kerr J’s
comment in Fairline that conduct (including an element of silence in
the particular instance) ‘cannot give rise to any contract, or fit into the
settled law governing offer and acceptance’, but that circumstances
may give rise to an estoppel operating against the offeror, preventing
him denying the existence of a contract positively set up by an of-
feree.66 Circumstances in which only an estoppel would be created
may give rise to a contract in the United States of America, of course,
in accordance with the Restatement (2d) of Contracts, s. 90, but the
situation is more restrictive in England and Wales. It is arguable that
the English law should move into line with s. 90, but equally arguable
that it could move away from conduct and the besetting problems of
silence to a more classical stance, leaving the law of restitution to do
justice in cases which thereby fall outside the law of contract. This is a
view which, of course, will be unattractive to relationalists, but would
allow for a clearer and conceptually ‘purer’ taxonomy of promise in
contract, as well as reasserting the primacy of the notion of promise
in acceptance as well as offer.67
66 See above at text to n. 42.
67 See generally C. Fried, Contract as Promise (Harvard UP: Cambridge, Mass., 1981)
ch. 4.
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To summarize: it is submitted that the rule in Felthouse v Bindley,
that silence cannot amount to acceptance, remains good in the law of
England and Wales. Conduct may amount to acceptance in the ab-
sence of a speech act to the contrary effect, but it is not silence in these
cases which effects acceptance. There are numerous dicta which seem
to suggest the contrary, but these can generally be explained as infelici-
tous phrasing, or by charitably assuming that, as the point was not
essential to the decision in the cases in question, those learned judges
had not, perhaps, addressed their minds thoroughly to the issue.
267
OFFEREE SILENCE AND CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT

